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1Not belonging to one’s self: Affect on facebook’s site governance page  
Abstract
This article makes a contribution to a growing number of works that discuss 
affect and social media. I use Freudian affect theory to analyse user posts on 
the public Site Governance Facebook page. Freud’s work may help us to 
explore the affectivity within the user narratives and I suggest that they are 
expressions of alienation, dispossession and powerlessness that relate to the 
users’ relations with Facebook as well as to their internal and wider social 
relations. The article thus introduces a new angle on studies of negative user 
experiences that draws on psychoanalysis and critical theory. 
Keywords
Freudian affect theory, user experience, Facebook, data ownership.
2Introduction 
This article applies Freudian affect theory to qualitatively analyse a number of 
user posts on a public Facebook page: the so-called Facebook Site 
Governance page that was set up in 2009 
(https://www.facebook.com/fbsitegovernance). On it, Facebook employees 
occasionally post about new features or policy changes. Many users use the 
site to express frustration at all sorts of problems they experience, such as 
identity theft, rows with other users, harassment from users, features that are 
not working for them and statements concerning the ownership of their data that 
is shared on Facebook. ‘What is lacking is a deeper investigation into how and 
why users have negative experiences on Facebook’ (Fox and Moreland, 2015: 
169), Fox and Moreland have recently noted. I propose one angle on such an 
investigation that theorises and analyses them using Freudian psychoanalysis. 
The Facebook posts that form the basis of this research were obtained in June 
2014 when an update about new data policy was posted 
https://www.facebook.com/fbsitegovernance/posts/10152840679374323 and in 
January 2016 after another update regarding revised terms, data policy and 
cookies policy had been rolled out in 2015 
https://www.facebook.com/fbsitegovernance/posts/10153018633659323. It is 
those two updates that formed the basis of this article. While the posts are 
3publicly accessible, the names of the users are not reproduced in this study. 
Many hundred posts were read that were posted as replies to the two updates 
and 11 were selected in order to provide an in-depth discussion of their affective 
dimensions. Based on the material a particular kind of relationship between 
Facebook and its users is theorised and for that reason a small sample was 
used. ‘Qualitative studies tend to work with small sample sizes in depth, which 
means that they can generate insights about the dynamics of particular cases' 
(Willig, 2008: 158). While not all user posts on the page are negative in nature, 
only comments that describe negative or frustrating experiences were selected 
for this study. Posts with a minimum number of 150 words were selected in 
order to adequately analyse potentially rich data. The posts were analysed in 
their entirety and not coded into different fragments in order to examine their 
overall tone and affective qualities. A detailed coding procedure potentially 
‘strips any remaining context’ (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000: 8) of qualitative 
data and I therefore examined posts as whole. Additionally, shorter posts and 
some fragments taken from longer posts were also analysed and are 
incorporated into the discussion of the longer posts as appropriate in order to 
take account of additional content. The following question guided the research 
process and selection of data: how do users communicate frustrating 
experiences on a public Facebook page? The research question therefore 
4shaped the selection of the material for analysis (Mayring, 2000). Upon reading 
the material, categories were drafted inductively that corresponded to the 
different Facebook posts that were analysed. Drawing on Hollway and 
Jefferson’s (2000), approach to examining particular data as a whole, qualitative 
content analysis was used that drew on psychoanalytic theory in its reading and 
interpretation of data (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000) The data was analysed in 
drawing on psychoanalytic affect theory that is situated and outlined in the next 
two sections.
While the posts analysed all share similar characteristics (e.g. frustration, 
affectivity), each may also represent an ideal type category with its own 
characteristics. While a large sample may have been beneficial, the scope of 
this article allows for limited discussion and therefore a limited number of posts 
were included for analysis. Future research could allow less space for 
theoretical introductions and more scope for empirical analyses. 
Category Name: Number of Posts: Coding Rules/ Summary of 
Content:
Affect and (Non)-Sense 3 Post is illogical and in tension 
with discourse. 
A Shattered Sense of 5 Post is about the articulation 
5Subjective Coherence of a fragile and threatened 
subjectivity in relation to 
Facebook. 
 Discharging the Affect 3 Post is about rational 
demands to Facebook that 
contribute to discharging the 
affect.
Affect and Digital Media
Recently, there is a growing number of publications on affect in specific relation 
to digital media (Gibbs 2011; Paasonen 2011; Sampson 2012; Clough 2013; 
Garde-Hansen and Gorton 2013; Hillis, Paasonen and Petit 2015). These 
accounts all emphasise the affectivity at stake in networked forms of 
communication. In their introduction to the edited volume Networked Affect, 
Hillis, Paasonen and Petit note that online user practices in the broadest sense 
(e.g. surfing the Internet, searching for something on Google, posting an update 
on Facebook) make for intense ‘affective investments’ (Hillis, Paasonen and 
Petit, 2015: 7) that may be ‘repetitive, frustrating, and potentially rewarding’ 
(Hillis, Paasonen and Petit, 2015: 7) for subjects. Networked communication 
6may be at times not ‘merely instrumental’ (Hillis, Paasonen and Petit, 2015: 10) 
and about goal directed actions but also beyond rationality and conscious 
control on part of the users. It is this idea of an intense form of embodied 
engagement with the Internet that I will draw on in this article. In doing so, I 
contribute to user experience studies, particularly to discussions of Facebook 
usability and users expressing frustration or anger (Hart et al., 2008; Koroleva, 
Krasnova and Günther, 2010; Light and Cassidy 2014). While these studies 
have theorised different dimensions of what can be broadly termed negative or 
frustrating aspects of usability on social media, I pay particular attention to user 
narratives as they are expressed on social media by drawing on psychoanalytic 
affect theory. Such a combination has not been made previously. Fox and 
Moreland (2015) note in their focus group study on Facebook users and 
psychological stress that ‘fewer studies have examined the nature of negative 
outcomes’ for users (Fox and Moreland, 2015, 168). While they conducted 
interviews, I address this gap in the research field by specifically focussing on 
affect and user discourses. 
In the past years, a growing number of diverse works commonly referred to 
as ‘affect theory’ has begun to emerge (e.g. Massumi, 2002; Sedgwick, 2003; 
Ahmed 2004; Brennan, 2004; Clough, 2007; Thrift, 2008; Gibbs, 2011; 
Blackman, 2012). Broadly speaking, the term ‘affect’ refers to an analytical 
7angle on relational processes of becoming that embrace human and non-
human bodies and entities (see Hemmings 2005; Gregg and Seigworth 2010; 
Leys 2011; Wetherell 2012 for detailed overviews). It is often used to describe 
an excess that cannot be adequately captured by textual or linguistic analyses 
alone (Hemmings 2005; Hillis Petit and Paasonen 2015). ‘Most definitions of 
affect highlight the central role of intensity and agree on the presence of a 
quality of excess, a quality of “more than”’ (Hillis, Petit and Paasonen, 2015: 1). 
Often, affect is invoked to signify processes that go beyond the singular subject 
and are instead of an intersubjective or relational nature between human and 
non-human entities. Rather than theorising and treating affect as a concept that 
goes against the individual subject and discourse, this article takes a different 
turn by arguing for a relevance of Freudian affect theory. Rather than being 
about ideas of non-representation and pre- or past-discursiveness, as some 
affect theories argue (e.g. Massumi, 2002; Lorimer, 2008; Thrift, 2008; 
Sampson, 2012), affect in the Freudian tradition is understood as being in 
tension with consciousness, agency and reflection. There is, however, a small 
common denominator between contemporary affect theories and Freudian 
affect theory. Affect is a process that involves sensations, intensities, bodies 
and excess. Margaret Wetherell (2012, 2013) has maintained that a 
combination of affect and discourse may be useful. She argues that such a 
8combination may pay attention to ‘the feel and patterning of bodies in action, the 
lively flow of social life and sticks closely to participants’ perspectives.’ 
(Wetherell, 2013: 364). Rather than treating affect and discourse as separate 
categories, they should be combined as ‘affective-discursive practice[s]’ 
(Wetherell, 2013: 363). How such practices may look like will be outlined more 
in the course of this article in drawing on Freudian affect theory. 
Affect and Freud 
Freud’s work on affect is complex and was subject to many changes throughout 
his life (Freud, 1981a, b, c, d, e). His approach has been clarified and 
developed by the psychoanalysts André Green (1999) and Ruth Stein (1991). 
For Freud, affect designates a bodily experience in a circuit-like movement that 
occurs inside the body and moves outwards (Freud, 1981a). This can be a 
reaction to a shocking image someone might have posted on Facebook for 
example or as a reaction towards a mental activity such as a fantasy or a 
thought. The subject responds affectively and in that response the affect is 
discharged. Only the moment of discharge is conscious to the subject, the 
preceding moments that led to the build-up of an affective response remain 
unconscious. An affect as such can be of a pleasurable or unpleasurable 
9nature. While Freud did not provide an exhaustive definition of the term, he 
explained it in the following manner in 1917 in his Introductory Lectures book:
And what is affect in the dynamic sense? It is in any case something 
highly composite. An affect includes in the first place particular motor 
innervations or discharges and secondly certain feelings; the latter are 
of two kinds—perceptions of the motor actions that have occurred and 
the direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which, as we say, give 
the affect its keynote (Freud, 1981d: 395).
An affective experience may thus consist of two aspects: discharges (in the 
physiological sense) and feelings. The feelings denote a perception by the 
subject that an affective experience took place and, secondly, feelings of 
pleasure or unpleasure. Ruth Stein defined the psychoanalytic understanding of 
affect in the following manner. In an affective experience, 
'”my body speaks itself to me”; when I am feeling, I possess my body, 
but at that same moment, the body is also its own speaker, and the 
three terms join together and link my possession ('my'), the object of 
this possession ('body'), and that which denies my possession ('it 
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speaks' - and in that it is its own master, or speaker, thereby denying 
my possession of itself) (Stein, 1991: 127).
The Freudian conception of affect is about a sudden and momentary loss of 
control or bodily agency. The subject experiences something beyond their 
conscious control and their body is experienced as an other in that moment.i 
Freud made a distinction that is followed in this article between an ‘idea’ and 
‘affect’ (Freud, 1981a, c). He understood ‘idea’ explicitly as the content of a 
thought; as something that is perceived externally or thought about internally 
(i.e. in the thought about a perception). Both aspects essentially refer to an 
inner and mental act. Affects have their own qualities and tonalities but they are 
in relation to an internal or external idea. While the two are different concepts, 
they are nonetheless interlinked. I return to this notion in my discussion of the 
first Facebook post. 
For Freud, affect is not outside or excluded from language but in tension with 
it. In an attempt to verbalise or write about an affective experience, the subject 
can say nothing about the affect as such but about its unpleasurable or 
pleasurable nature and what might have triggered it, as shown in the earlier 
quote by Freud. An affective response is structured by an ‘energic upsurge that 
invades language and may destructure it to the point that it becomes 
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unintelligible’ and it marks a ‘return of the corporal raw material into language’ 
(Green, 1999: 174). Hillis, Paasonen and Petit explain that writing about an 
affective experience is ‘an act of mediation where bodily impressions, 
modulations, arousals, and motions are translated in order to be brought into 
the representational of the text’ (2015: 12). This idea of translating is also 
present in Freudian affect theory. As parts of an affective response are 
consciously experienced, the subject may reflect on it in a delayed manner.
Affect and (Non)-Sense
Principally, the affective experiences discussed in this article may be 
adequately theorised as such by drawing on Freudian ideas because they may 
present a momentary experience as a diffuse state. Such an experience is part 
of the wider user experience of using Facebook. It suddenly occurs and fades 
away again. It is argued that the quotes that will be discussed refer to 
experiences that the users may not quite understand, they may not make sense 
to them and that is why they respond in such affective manners. In writing about 
them and getting them off their chest, they also rationalise something that is 
beyond them and look for explanations elsewhere. This is evident in the 
following quote:  
12
I do not want to be contacted AT ALL BY SCAMPER. When I go to my 
privacy settings there is not any "block" app available. He has now also 
contacted me as "Nibbles" because when I reported Nibbles You said I 
already had made a report.
THIS IS HARASSMENT. THEIR SITES HAVE A MECHANISM THAT 
PREVENTS ME FROM DELETING THEIR COMMENT FROM MY POST, 
WHICH IS PREVENTING ME FROM MANAGING MY OWN PAGE. I 
MUST ASSUME THAT FACEBOOK HAS ENABLED THEM TO DO THIS, 
OTHERWISE___HOW IS IT POSSIBLE!
I will contact the federal authorities if this sort of HARASSMENT of me 
continues, for the amount of good it will do, since You guys are in tight 
with the FascIst-in-Chief___that piece of shit DESPOT OBAMA.
I will briefly remain on a level of understanding before interpreting the post in 
terms of its affective qualities. The user expresses a very understandable wish: 
not to be contacted and harassed by another Facebook user. The user 
‘Scamper’ seems to have created another profile (‘Nibbles’) and also contacted 
them through that profile. The above user informed Facebook about the 
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unwanted messages but it failed to respond and the user’s attempts of blocking 
the user seem to have been unsuccessful. Facebook is the only agent here that 
could do something about the user’s problems, but it has failed to act. As with 
many other comments on the site, there is no response by Facebook to the 
problems outlined. The context of this post is thus an experience of being 
harassed by other users that moves from a factual description into rage, threats 
and insults midway through the post.
The above quote is difficult to decipher: what exactly are the user’s 
problems? They seem to be receiving unwanted messages from a user or 
multiple users and were unable to block them. It is not clear who those users 
are or what is meant by ‘their sites’. The exclamation ‘otherwise how is it 
possible’ points to the incomprehensible experiences the user writes about. 
They give the explanation (to themselves) that Facebook has actually ‘enabled’ 
‘them’ to do certain things that the user has no access to. 
This post is similar to many on the Site Governance page and it shows that 
the user tries to express something here. The first lines are comprehensible but 
the post quickly slips into an affective mode of expression that is in tension with 
sense, logic and appropriateness. The user articulates having no control over 
who contacts them and Facebook has not helped. The user has no power over 
what has happened to them on Facebook and they situate this in more general 
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narratives about a world where corporations such as Facebook are bedfellows 
with governments and have conspired against ordinary citizens like them. 
However, they still write that they will resort to the ‘federal authorities’, an 
arguable contradiction of their discourse for, in their logic, the authorities would 
also be ‘in tight’ with Facebook. It is here that we can see how affect and its 
immediate aftermath are translated into words. It is an attempt to translate and 
express something that is intersected by an affective dimension and was first 
experienced as a bodily state. Affect shows itself here in inconsistencies, 
contradictions and a free flowing discourse without much structure. The threat 
of contacting the federal authorities is also an articulation of powerlessness in 
itself because it symbolises the last hope for the user and it is questionable if 
the federal authorities would respond to their demands. Going back to Freud’s 
(1981a) distinction between ‘affect’ and ‘idea’, one may argue that the post 
begins with affective descriptions about the user’s experiences and then moves 
to narratives that are more structured and might be results of more reflexive 
processes that come closer to the concept of ‘idea’. The user offers a reflection 
that Facebook has enabled ‘them’ (other users) to do certain things and relates 
the SNS to the US president. The post thus moves from affective dimensions to 
a narrative about rationalisation in a free flowing manner. The user argues that 
other users, Facebook, and even the US president have conspired against 
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them. The user attempts a logical (although we might perceive it as illogical) 
rationalisation. They experienced harassment and concluded that such 
practices were enabled by Facebook because their attempts to block or report 
were in vain. Similarly, another user has also commented on the Facebook Site 
Governance page: 
Are 100 posts too many for a week? I can't NOT do something if I don't know 
exactly what I'm not supposed to do! The notification doesn't even define 
exactly what I did wrong. How are you teaching me not to do this thing you 
consider wrong if you don't explain what I did and tell what I need to do to 
avoid it happening again? It makes no sense! Of course, I know because the 
only thing I've done today is work by posting new stuff in my groups. This is 
how I make my living btw so you really hurt me when you do this.
What affects the reader of such posts the most is its sense of anger and 
incoherence. Sense and non-sense are somewhat aligned in the users’ 
‘affective-discursive practice[s]’ (Wetherell, 2013: 363). Ellis, Tucker and Harper 
describe the act of talking or writing about affect as follows: ‘Affective 
experiences that have yet to be fully symbolized by the individual figuratively or 
linguistically entail speech which tends to be vague, imprecise, and incoherent, 
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but nonetheless distinguish a certain something.’ (Ellis, Tucker and Harper, 
2013: 726). This may be exemplified further by the quote below.
I do not like it that your FACE BOOK COMPANY is actually putting my life at 
risk.. several times my account has been hacked into and personal info has 
been divulged. And where does it stop , your FB seems to keep askng me 
things I do not want to divulge are you saying that it your right as well and all 
FB users rights/? WELL it is not.. so QUIT ASKING ME THINGS THAT I 
HAVE NOT ALREADY ANSWERED BECAUSE IF I WANTED TO ANSWER 
THEM I WOULD HAVE A VERY LONG TIME AGO> THIS SEEMS VERY 
DANGEROUS TO ME> AND NOT TO MENTION YOU THINK ITS OKAY 
FOR OTHERS TO SHARE OUR FINANCIAL INFORMATION THAT SOME 
OF US HAVE TO WRITE ON FB TO MAKE PAYMENTS ETC> ?? THAT IS 
LUDICROUS AND I DO NOT BELIEVE YOU HAVE THAT RIGHT NOT 
DoES ANYONE ELSE ON FB !! WHEN WE CHOOSE PRIVATE FOR INFo 
THAT IS HOW IT SHOULD BE!!
The user may have been a victim of someone who hacked into his account 
multiple times. Just like the first post that was discussed, the one above 
consists of a highly affective mode of writing that is difficult to understand. The 
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user may criticise Facebook for responding inadequately to their experience of 
being hacked. Personal information may have been disclosed and in not 
responding, Facebook has put their ‘life at risk’. The rest of the post can be 
seen as being in tension with discourse and logic. The user demands Facebook 
should quit asking things that they have ‘not already answered’. This may refer 
to notifications or requests by Facebook that the user does not wish to follow or 
respond to. It is unclear if the last sentences of the post refer to financial 
information that the user communicated to others via private messages that had 
been exposed because of someone hacking into their account. The user may 
accuse Facebook of being behind the hack, or regard Facebook as having 
failed to secure their privacy. The post may be read as an affective expression 
of powerlessness and of a hierarchy on the social networking site that is 
skewed. The user responds to this by stating that it is not Facebook’s right to do 
certain things with their data. 
Drawing on a Freudian model allows one to conceptualise the term of ‘affect’ 
as articulating itself in fleeting and vague moments that come and go in a 
rhythmic manner. The users on Facebook are not permanently frustrated or 
face unpleasurable experiences but it is specific experiences that are felt bodily 
and affectively which may push a wider sense of being and feeling powerless 
back into consciousness and lead to heated and often incoherent posts and 
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reflections on the wider social and cultural surroundings. Such as the above 
quotes being about questions of security, the state, cooperation between 
governments and corporations, as well as issues of privacy, hacking and online 
rights.  Part of the posts may read as incomprehensible free associations and 
‘[y]et it is here that we are most likely to discover the affective impacts’ (Ellis, 
Tucker and Harper, 2013: 727) of the structural relations on Facebook. In other 
words, the above passages illustrate how affect ‘lends the color, the nuances, 
and the modulations to the verbal sign’ (Stein, 1999: 134). 
A Shattered Idea of Subjective Coherence
Fuchs and Sevignani (2013) argue that many Facebook users stress the useful 
and important functions of the website and disregard troubling questions of data 
ownership and lack of control in their everyday use. The possible – even if 
involuntary – role that users play in reproducing their own state of 
powerlessness by using and feeding Facebook with data that is appropriated 
and sold for profit maximization is seldom mentioned in the posts on the 
Facebook Site Governance page. The underlying aspects of the dark site of 
Facebook: inequality, commodification, lack of transparency and control are 
mostly hidden behind the social use value of the SNS. They may become 
visible when users experience situations that are discussed in this article. In 
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experiences that are about sections of Facebook that do not work according to 
the users’ wishes and demands, a specific experience may acquire such a 
momentary power over the user that all useful functions of Facebook are 
overshadowed. One user frustratingly expresses that Facebook should stop 
violent content from being posted: ‘you don't care but there are way to many 
who do and you shouldn't let the forum you make all your $$$$ from leave a 
bad taste in ppls mouths:’ The next quote exemplifies a dominance of a 
negative experience further:
If my posts are glitched anymore..I mean they are actually taken away 
from me..I will file.a lawsuit against Facebook..my son is a former Atty 
General..and he is fantastic prosecutor..I WILL FILE CHARGES WITH 
THE FED. TRADE COMM...I WILL HAVE THEM MONITOR MY POSTS 
AS I TYPE THEM..AND SEE FOR THEMSELVES..SICK OF YOUR 
LIBERAL CRAP..ARE YOU EVEN AMERICAN??????????????/
One may read this post as being about a specific experience. In this case 
Facebook posts that the user has made are disappearing. They feel that they 
are ‘taken away’ from them by Facebook and the user wishes to act against this 
injustice by filing a lawsuit and contacting the federal trade commission. 
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Particularly the mentioning of the latter evokes notions of consumer capitalism, 
customer service and the corporate nature of Facebook that can only be 
combated by an emphasis of consumer and citizen rights. The context of this 
post is thus marked by a sense of powerlessness over something that belongs 
to the user and is actually of their own making (the posts). The user makes 
reference to the notion of American citizenship and the federal trade 
commission that is part of (consumer capitalist) US society is called upon by 
them for help. In the same move, they question if the Facebook owners’ are 
actual American citizens. 
The post, like the previous ones, starts with a factual description of the 
experience but quickly slips into an affective mode of articulation that is 
characterised by the all caps writing, threats against Facebook and graphic 
words such as ‘sick’ or ‘crap’ that exemplify a verbalisation of affect’s bodily 
ontology. 
The fact that one has created something that appears on Facebook that is of 
one’s own doing but is then deleted or disappears may fundamentally shatter 
the idea that one can possess, master and control one’s own data and, 
ultimately, that one is in full control of one’s self. That is why one can interpret 
the above post from a psychoanalytic angle as having affective qualities that 
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could be described as unpleasure, rage, anger, powerlessness. Another user 
post also exemplifies this: 
When I google anything it appears on my newsfeed. Articles pertaining to 
private sites that I've been on. Take for instance today, ovarian cancer. How 
PATHETIC YOU ARE to invade my privacy!!! Many times I've also set my 
page to private,!only to be told it's viewable to the public!!!!!
Another user remarked:
How can Facebook like a page for me? The thumb is mine! Only I can use it! 
Stop using my name in vain, on pages that I don't even know!
The affective dimensions of powerlessness and a lack of control and that the 
users might possibly have anything to do with them are expelled in the above 
posts. This act of exclusion is achieved in posting on the Facebook Site 
Governance page about the affective experience. In their narratives, the users 
have excluded themselves from playing any, even involuntary, part in their 
relation with Facebook. In their narratives, the users dissociate themselves from 
their relation with Facebook and argue that solely Facebook is to blame for their 
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experiences (see also Fox and Moreland, 2015 for a similar discussion based 
on focus group data). 
Affect, one may argue, is thus attached to specific experiences and ‘ideas’ in 
the Freudian sense. The affect re-emerges from time to time in experiences that 
are symptomatic of it: incomprehensible experiences, loss of data, lack of 
identification and control, harassment. Such a lack of control may be further 
visible in the following quote: 
You have continued your actions of tearing my page apart, and writing 
comments that would no more have come from my mouth than me 
announcing that I am the Christ!! How dare you! That is as slandering 
as you can get, bigoted, and down right destructive. I intend to put this 
out for all to see how you are running this site and for them to watch out 
for the very company that we have all trusted to share thoughts, and 
news. […] If I were to have written something like that against a country, 
a belief or a people, I would expect that I would be hung. I don't have 
any bigoted beliefs, do not take part in them, and do not come in on my 
page and write information.
23
The users may be seen as articulating a sense of broken trust and a feeling of 
betrayal. The above quote seems to take issue with Facebook administrators 
who have modified a page. An implicit lack of transparency on part of Facebook 
is articulated and the user wishes to share their dissatisfaction with Facebook 
so that everyone may see how Facebook is run. The quote may actually 
illustrate that the way Facebook is run remains largely hidden and unaccounted 
for for many users.  The user addresses Facebook directly and expresses a 
double standard in relation to how Facebook may act and how they may act 
with regards to the actions Facebook is accused of. It may be argued that 
Facebook could do the things the user accuses the site of doing (whether they 
really did occur or not is beyond the scope here) because the relationship is 
rooted in material inequalities. Facebook owns the infrastructures and website 
itself and controls the power to delete, modify or add content to a page as they 
please and the user may feel that they cannot do the same without grave 
consequences (‘would be hung’). The post, like the one about the disappearing 
posts, may be seen as an expression of an awareness of powerlessness. In 
both, the state of being aware is primarily an affective one that points to fleeting 
moments that underscore it. There may thus be an affective disruption of the 
very idea that data on Facebook belongs to the users. 
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This is expressed in feelings of betrayal in the above quote. The fact that the 
user actually plays a part in the relation that is betrayed is not mentioned but all 
actions are put to Facebook and the user essentially expresses a powerless 
frustration. 
Discharging the Affect 
What is so unique about the Facebook Site Governance page, then, is that a 
space is offered where users can respond to the posts by Facebook officials 
and express their opinions. As discussed, many use the site to share frustrating 
or unpleasurable experiences. In all cases that were discussed, Facebook does 
not work for the users and aspects of powerlessness have come to the fore. 
The users feel so strongly about such experiences that they have to go 
somewhere and post about them. The affect speaks and demands discharge. It 
finds an outlet on the Facebook Site Governance page where it is rendered into 
representation: an external, objective written account that is for everyone to 
see. This conscious act of writing about the experience and its wider 
consequences marks the last sequence in the affective experience. It further 
suggests that the affect has been discharged and neutralised through the act of 
writing. The existence of the Site Governance page therefore may contribute to 
appeasing users and guarantees in many instances that they have stayed on 
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Facebook and continue to use it. Facebook has thus created a space within the 
SNS where affects can be discharged and users may return to a more calm and 
tranquil state after posting about their experiences. The act of posting may thus 
constitute an additional way of discharging the affective experience that 
occurred in the moment the posts disappeared, for example. In posting on the 
page and in fully discharging the affect after the post has been written, the user 
responds by telling Facebook that they ‘will’ file a lawsuit, contact the federal 
trade commission and so on. The user whose page was modified similarly 
expresses that ‘I intend to put this out for all to see how you are running this site 
[…]’. Another user’s post is similarly about specific actions in response to 
Facebook:
The deletion of my personal or business account before Jan 1, 2015 or 
deletion of this post that I will be taking a screenshot of, Facebook agrees to 
pay restitution in the amount of $100,000 USD per hour to a maximum of $1 
Million USD a day.
Furthermore, if Facebook does not personally reply to my request to be 
waived from any updated agreements, Facebook agrees to to remove ALL 
my information, including my IP from all their servers and the servers of any 
26
3rd party company on or before Jan 1, 2015 once I close/deactivate my 
account.
Failure to do so, Facebook agrees to the same penalties as above of 
$100,000 USD an hour up to $1 Million a day until all personal information is 
removed.
It is not my responsibility to make sure Facebook is notified of my new terms 
of service. By simply waving me and making me exempt from any future 
terms or policy changes I will cancel my new Updated Terms & Conditions.
Here, the user has turned the relationship on its head. Whereas the preceding 
posts were all written from the point of view of the users and detailed their 
experiences and possible future actions, the user in the above post has actively 
assumed a role that Facebook normally holds. ‘Facebook agrees to pay 
restitution in the amount of $100,000 USD per hour to a maximum of $1 Million 
USD a day’, was written for example. In that narrative, the user (discursively) 
makes Facebook do and agree to specific actions and demands. Such a 
narrative is similar to Facebook’s own logics of running the site, in so far as 
users are made to do certain things without real choice or alternatives (e.g. 
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agreeing to new terms and conditions) if they wish to stay on the SNS (Fuchs 
and Sevignani, 2013). Another user similarly expressed: ‘I would also like to 
point out that my information on facebook is private unless i wish to share it as 
public, therefore no government agency can use information on my facebook in 
any court of law in the united kingdom or brussels.’ A third user’s post may be 
seen as a similar attempt to render Facebook accountable or equal in its 
relationship to the user(s):
So basically,what you're saying is that you collect ALL of the information 
about me. 
How about a quid pro quo and you owners and administrators give me ALL of 
your information about your families,photos,friends...? No? Didn't think so.
 
While there may be a sense of irony in the quote, it nonetheless shows a 
demand for a relationality that could be grounded in more equal terms. Rather 
than pathologizing the quotes discussed in this article as being about irrational 
demands, megalomania or simple weirdness, I am interested in exploring what 
their psychological functions for the users may be. The promises and demands 
expressed by the users signify consciousness, possession, agency, visibility 
and transparency – all qualities that both the Facebook – user relationship and 
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the user’s individual affective experience (that is the relationship to themselves) 
lack. As a way of discharging, it is thus not surprising that the users resort to 
naming who they will contact, what they demand Facebook to do, or what their 
specific actions will be. In doing so, they have also, literally, ascribed 
themselves with agency and power both in relation to their affective experience 
(that has left them feeling beside or alien from themselves momentarily) and in 
relation to Facebook. The question whether they really hold that power, or if 
they really did contact the listed authorities, or were paid by Facebook as the 
other quote demands, do not matter here. It is the act of writing that establishes 
a momentary tranquillity. A psychoanalytic angle on the posts thus suggests 
that in writing the users have reassured themselves that they both own and 
control their body and data. The user, who experienced modified or added posts 
to their page, similarly writes that they wish to show how Facebook is really run 
by telling other users of the site’s actions. In that way, they have recaptured a 
sense of agency that is about unmasking unjust and uncontrollable measures 
taken by Facebook. This agency is expressed through the act of posting and 
specifically of writing about the purposes of the post: to inform other users.   
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Conclusion 
The main intervention this paper makes is to argue for Freudian affect theory as 
an analytical tool in relation to questions of user experiences on corporate 
social media. 11 user posts from the public Site Governance Facebook page 
were used to illustrate the conceptual values of Freudian affect theory with 
regards to social media. While the Facebook Site Governance page may 
contribute to feelings of (momentary) appeasement in users, it does not change 
the fact that Facebook users ‘do not have the decision power to influence 
Facebook’s rules and design, such as the content of the terms of use and the 
privacy policy’ (Fuchs and Sevignani, 2013: 258). The underlying tone of the 
affective experiences that I discussed in this article could thus be defined as 
one of alienation in the Marxist sense. The classical term ‘alienation’ (Marx, 
2009) has recently been revived in critical works on digital media and questions 
that concern data ownership and privacy on social networking sites (Comor, 
2010; Andrejevic, 2011, 2014; Fuchs, 2012; Fisher, 2012, 2015; Fuchs and 
Sevignani, 2013; Sevignani 2013; Krüger and Johanssen 2014). Critical 
theorists argue that users are alienated from commercial social media because 
they do not own the websites and cannot fully control the data they have 
generated. Users are alienated from Facebook because their data (e.g. posted 
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content) are also extracted for advertising and profit maximization (Fuchs and 
Sevignani, 2013). 
The dynamics between Facebook and its users show themselves as relations 
that are characterised by inequality with regards to power, website ownership, 
the treatment and control of data and general support of users. On Facebook, 
such relations may be felt as vague ideas that articulate and manifest 
themselves in specific user experiences (e.g. of disappearing posts or 
unwanted harassment). The knowledge of such experiences that can be 
characterised as ones of alienation that users may have may remain lurking in 
them and what is left is the affective quality of the vague idea that cannot be 
eliminated and attaches itself to specific experiences. These experiences are 
then written about on the Facebook Site Governance page. In other words, 
users may be kind of aware of their state of alienation and powerlessness that 
is enforced in specific affective experiences and respond to it by means of 
writing about them which can be seen as a reflexive act. 
The users’ state of being kind of or vaguely aware of their relations with 
Facebook has been researched in an empirical studies with Facebook users 
about privacy (Sevignani, 2013). Sevignani writes that ‘users are kind of aware 
that people who own and control the SNS are appropriating societally-produced 
surplus’ (Sevignani, 2013: 331). There is a kind of general awareness on parts 
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of many users but it may be essentially unconscious or denied. It is then re-
actualised and re-emerges in specific experiences that are then hastily, 
affectively posted on the Facebook Site Governance page in an almost free 
associative manner. As discussed, the feeling of dispossession of user 
generated content is mirrored in a general (bodily) dispossession. Any affective 
experience bears witness to a kind of fundamental dispossession in relation to 
the self-other relation that is laid bare by affect. A Freudian angle on affect and 
alienation thus allows us to go beyond a political economy perspective that 
mostly discusses the structural characteristics of alienation on Facebook with 
regards to ownership and exploitation of user generated content. It further 
suggests that the authors of many of the posts discussed are not aware of what 
exactly happened or why e.g. their posts disappeared. The problems the users 
report are solely attributed to Facebook in a relation that is uphold through 
posting and staying on the site but is essentially characterised by a one 
dimensional relation because there are no replies by Facebook. While 
Facebook cannot respond to the hundreds of comments, its administrators 
could respond to some that occur again and again and touch on the same 
issues. They could further give the users more facilities to control their data and 
privacy settings and would of course need to stop selling user data without 
offering anything in return apart from a free website to its users. Instead, 
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Facebook has created a space with the Site Governance page that signifies 
transparency and user involvement but in reality upholds alienation and mere 
appeasement. While the establishment of the page may be seen as a first step 
towards visibility about Facebook’s policies, users could additionally be 
provided with real agency and opportunities to shape the website and take part 
in a dialogue about its future changes. In that way, the relationship between 
affect and idea that I have theorized as uneven with regards to negative user 
experiences could be rendered more even. Many user posts are characterised 
by affectivity and representational ideas are deployed by users to make sense 
of their unpleasurable, affective experiences and situate them within wider 
social contexts (e.g. the US president, the federal trade commission, Facebook 
being a corporate website, general fears about surveillance, online harassment 
and hacking) that are entangled with but also go beyond Facebook. In that way, 
we may also read the affective experiences that are turned into narratives as 
momentary testimonies of the users’ (un)conscious anxieties of living in a world 
that is growing ever more complex, (media) technologically saturated and more 
difficult to understand and control for individuals. In offering some sort of 
response to the user posts, Facebook would not be able to erase such wider 
anxieties but may at least to acknowledge and recognise them on a smaller 
level. Such a recognition may contribute to a sense in the users that they are 
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listened to and valued by Facebook beyond mere economic metrics. Such a 
sense of feeling both valued and powerful may be something many have lost 
with regards to contemporary politics and social developments in capitalism.  
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